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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utab

GARY WOOD,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case
vs.

No. 8818

DARRELL L. TAYLOR,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a verdict and judgment of the
Second Judicial District Court arising out of an accident that
happened on November 3, 1956 approximately one mile north
of Paris, Idaho on U. S. Highway 89. The plaintiff was a nonpaying guest passenger in the car of the defendant. The court
denied a motion for a new trial and this appeal is taken from
the denial of said motion.
3
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The accident from which this action arises occurred about
four o'clock p.m. on November 3, 1956. Defendant and
plaintiff had been acquainted for some time prior to the date
of the accident, but had not seen each other for a considerable
period of time. They met in Montpelier, Idaho by accident
at about noon on the day of the accident. After some conversation they decided to go for a ride in defendant's automobile,
upon which certain mechanical work had just been completed
at the Bear River Motor Garage. After riding around for a
short time in Montpelier they drove east on Highway 30 North
to Border, Wyoming. The road between Montpelier and Border
is rather winding and somewhat mountainous and is generally
a more difficult road to drive than U. S. Highway 89 traveling
south from Montpelier upon which the accident occurred.
Plaintiff traveled at a speed between 50 and 55 miles per
hour en route to Border and returning to Montpelier from
Border.
When plaintiff and defendant returned to Montpelier
they stopped and picked up Miss Karen Wright, a girl friend
of defendant, and started out for another ride in a Southerl}
direction on U. S. Highway 89. After they had left Montpelier
and traveled a short distance defendant increased the speed
of the automobile to approximately 70 miles per hour. Plaintiff
made no protest at this speed nor to the manner in which
defendant was driving. The passenger, Karen Wright, protested
but stated that she had made a protest not because she was
concerned about defendant's driving, but because she just
did not like to go fast. At the town of Ovid, which is approxi-
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mately five miles from Montpelier, defendant allowed the
right wheels of the automobile to go slightly onto the gravel
shoulder in the course of negotiating a 90 degree curve in the
town. However, at that point there is a broad level gravel area
at the outside of the curve with no obstructions. The parties
then proceeded on south on Highway 89 toward Paris, Idaho
at about the same speed of 70 miles per hour.
During the entire afternoon the weather was clear and
visibility was good. At the point where the accident occurred,
about one mile north of Paris, Idaho, the highway is paved,
generally level and straight. The road surface is about 19 feet
in width with generally level gravel shoulders of approximately
6 to 8 feet in width. The speed limit at the point of accident
was 60 miles per hour. Traffic was light. Commencing at a
point just south of the point where the impact took place
there is a double yellow no-passing line on the highway and
about one quarter of a mile to the south there is the crest of
a knoll which obstructs vision beyond that point to the south.
The only person who actually saw the accident occur is the
passenger, Karen Wright. Her testimony, supported generally
by the other evidence adduced is that a farm tractor pulled
onto the highway from a side road leading into the highway
from a field to the defendant's right or to the west of the
highway. The tractor proceeded onto the highway making a
wide turn to go south, in the course of the turn crossing over
the center line onto the northbound portion of the highway.
The large hay wagon followed the path of the tractor and thus
in the course of entering the highway the tractor and hay
wagon generally obstructed both lanes of travel on the highway. Defendant apparently observed the hay wagon as it was

5
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obstructing the highway and in some pos1t1on astraddle the
center line of the highway attempted to pass to the right of
the tractor and wagon. He failed to do so and collided with
the right rear corner and right side of the hay wagon and
with the right rear wheel of the tractor. After the collision
the car went off into the barrow pit and rolled over.
Plaintiff was thrown from the automobile into a barbwire
fence and the injury and damage to his leg resulted. Defendant
was pinned under the car and was rendered unconscious.
Plaintiff has no clear recollection of the accident itself. Defendant has no recollection of any events prior to the return
of plaintiff and defendant to Montpelier. Both at the time
when Karen Wright observed the hay wagon and tractor prior
to the collision and at the time of collision the hay wagon was
straddling the center line or was prortuding to the east of
the center line and was effectively obstructing both lanes of
travel on the highway.
Other than the protest by Karen Wright on the basis
described above and the incident at the turn in Ovid, plaintiff
and Karen Wright conceded that defendant's driving was
alright, that they were not concerned and that he seemed to
be operating his automobile in a prudent and efficient manner.
There had been no other unusual incidents from the time the
parties left Montpelier to the time when the accident occurred.
At the point where the collision occurred, the right wheels
of defendant's automobile were about one foot off of the
oil on the west shoulder of the road. The left wheels were
on the paved portion of the highway. The terrain w~ts such
that the level of the fields to the west of the highway was

6
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below the level of the highway and the farm tractor and hay
wagon came up a slight rise in the entry road as they entered
onto the highway. The barrow pit at the side of the road to
the west into which defendant's automobile rolled after the
collision was also below the level of the surface of the highway.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS WHOLLY INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING A MISTRIAL BECAUSE OF PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS MADE
BY COUNSEL IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT END OF PLAINTIFF'S
CASE, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, AND MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT NAMING THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION A PARTY PLAINTIFF AS
,!'HE VETERANS' ADlvfiNISTRA TION WAS A REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST.
7
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•

POINT V
ERROR IN LAW TO ALLOW IN EVIDENCE ASSIGNMENT OF A PERSONAL INJURY TO THE VETERANS'
ADMINISTRATION AND TO ALLOW EVIDENCE RELATING TO A HOSPITAL BILL AT THE VETERANS'
ADMINISTRATION HOSPITAL.

POINT VI
THE DAMAGES ARE EXCESSIVE AND WERE INFLUENCED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS
TO THE JURY AND PREJUDICED BY THE ERRONEOUS
SUBMISSION OF THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION
HOSPITAL BILL.

POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
TESTIMONY OF ALVIN W. FOLGER AND DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE THIS TESTIMONY.

POINT VIII
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GlVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS r\ N l) iT'\ ll\1PROPERL Y INSTRUCTING THE JURY.
8
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS WHOLLY INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT.
Inasmuch as plaintiff was a non-paying guest passenger
in the automobile of defendant, the plaintiff was obligated to
meet the requirements of Section 49-1001, Idaho Code, which
reads as follows:
"No person transported by the owner or operator
of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for
such transportation shall have a cause for damages
against such owner or operator for death or loss, in
case of accident, unless such accident shall have been
intentional on the part of said owner or operator or
caused by his intoxication or his reckless disregard
of the rights of others."
The complaint of the plaintiff contains no allegation, and
there was no proof that the accident was intentional or caused
by the intoxication of the host and therefore the only portion
of the statute that concerns us here is whether or not the conduct of the defendant amounted to "reckless disregard of the
rights of others."
The Idaho Supreme Court has defined the term "reckless
disregard for the rights of others" on many occasions. In the
case of Foberg v. Harrison, 71 Ida. 11, 225 Pac. 2d 69, ( 1950),
the court stated as follows:
"The term 'reckless disregard' as used in said section
( 49-1001, Idaho Code supra) means an act or conduct
destitute of heed or concern for consequences; espe9
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cially foolishly heedless of danger, headlong rash;
wanton disregard, or conscious indifference to consequences."
In a later case, Mason v. Mootz, 73 Idaho 461, 253 P.
2d 240, 243 ( 195 3), the Idaho Supreme Court stated as follows in referring to the foregoing statement:
"This implies a consciousness of danger and a willingness to assume the risk, or an indifference to consequences." (Emphasis supplied.)
Also see the following cases:
Hudson v. Decker, ____ Utah ____ , 317 P. 2d 594, 1957;
Grant v. Clarke, ____ Idaho ____ , 305 P. 2d 752, 1956;
Wilson v. Bacon, ____ Idaho ____ , 304 P. 2d 908, 1956;
Turner v. Purdum, 77 Idaho 130, 289 P. 2d 608, 1955.
The case of Mason v. Mootz, supra, further states at
page 243 as follows:
"In a guest case the burden is on the plaintiff to
prove that the accident was caused by conduct on the
part of the defendant amounting to reckless disregard
as so defined. Proof of ordinary negligence will not
suffice." (Many cases cited therein.)
There is absolutely no evidence from the facts in this case
that the defendant showed a reckless disregard for the safety
of others or that he was conscious of any danger and was willing to assume the risk with an indifference to the consequences.
The facts in this case are that the plaintiff, defendant and Karen
Wright were out for a ride on a straight, dry, lightly traveled
arterial highway in the afternoon of November ), 1956. A
tractor pulling a large hay wagon entered the highway and
10
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was going at a very slow speed when the defendant's car
struck it on the right rear side. The defendant does not remember the details of the accident (R. 220).
The plaintiff does not remember what happened prior
to the accident and thereafter as he was looking for some sun
glasses and did not see the tractor and large hay wagon in
the highway (R. 131, 132).
The plaintiff and defendant had taken a drive to Border,
Wyoming prior to the accident and nothing was unusual about
the way the car was driven between Montpelier, Idaho, and
Border, Wyoming (R. 126). The plaintiff further stated that
he at no time made any objections to the way in which the
defendant was driving the car from the time they left Montpelier to the scene of the accident (R. 155, 156).

Miss Karen Wright's testimony places the large hay wagon
at an angle and across the center line and certainly she is the
only person who saw the tractor and hay wagon prior to the
accident. Her testimony (R. 118) is to the effect that the
tractor and hay wagon had to make a wide swing on the highway and was not going straight down the road on its own side
at the time of the accident.
Further the testimony is that the blacktopped surface is
19 feet wide (R. 46) and the hay wagon and load of hay was
10 feet 2 inches (R. 59) so it follows that part of the obstruction on the highway was over the center line, and that both
lanes of the highway were at least partially obstructed at this
time.
It is obvious that the defendant under these circumstances
11
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did what he thought best at the time he was confronted with
the obstacle in his path, and made reasonable efforts under
the circumstances to avoid a collision. The plaintiff cannot
recover from this defendant unless he can prove the proximate
cause of the accident was defendant's heedless and reckless
disregard for the lives of others. This he has failed to do. Mere
negligence of the defendant is not sufficient to recover damages.
A recent Idaho case that has an analagous situation to
the case at hand is Turner v. Purdum, supra.
In the Turner case Purdum was driving a Hudson automobile and Turner, the plaintiff, was riding with him. They
were traveling at about 45-50 miles per hour. It was windy,
with some dust and occasionally a sprinkle of rain and was
dark.
Turner was resting m the front seat with Purdum and
remembers nothing of the accident.
One Malden Dye, at the same time, was driving a farm
tractor in the same direction as Purdum and was towing a
two-way, two-row potato digger. The tractor was equipped
with a white light, 4Y2 inches in diameter, fastened under the
seat of the tractor. The light illuminated the digger and road
to the rear. Purdum saw the white light about one-half mile
away and did not see it again until he was within 25-30 feet
of the digger and it was too late then to do anything. The
Hudson crashed into the digger and Turner was injured.
(The testimony in the present case is that the appellant
was not going faster than 70 miles per hour and the condition
of the road and the terrain are stated above.)
12
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The court said in the Turner case as follows:
"Appellant fails to point out any act or acts of
negligence or combination of such acts by respondent
Purdum which appellant considers as constituting
reckless disregard. The evidence does not disclose that
respondent Purdum was driving at a rate of speed
which could constitute more than ordinary negligence
under the circumstances. His failure to see the potato
digger in time to avoid the accident could not be more
than ordinary negligence. There is nothing in the record
to indicate that respondent Purdom was or should have
been conscious of danger and to indicate a willingness
on his part to assume the risk, or an indifference to
consequences."
It is to be noted that exactly the same elements of possible
negligence exist in the Turner case as in the instant case. These
are: (a) speed which may be excessive or unsafe under the
conditions then and there existing and (b) improper lookout
or momentary inattention. There is absolutely no evidence of
any other wrongful or negligent acts on the part of defendant.
Further, defendant was confronted with a more difficult situation by reason of the wide turn of the tractor and hay wagon
and the resulting obstruction of both sides of the highway,
than was Purdum.

The state of New Mexico has exactly the same guest statute
as Idaho and the court of New Mexico in a recent case, Smith
v. Meadows, ____ N.M. ____ , 242 P. 2d 1006, (1952) held that
speed itself does not justify a conclusion that the accident
was caused by defendant's heedless and reckless disregard for
others.
The facts in the Smith case, supra, were that the plaintiff
l)
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was riding as a guest in the defendant's car when it collided
with the car of a third person, Gomez. Gomez had parked
his car on the side of the road, without lights, due to the fact
the motor was heating up. The testimony is to the effect that
the defendant was traveling between 70 and 80 miles per hour
at night.
The court on page 1011 states the very purpose of the
guest statute is to prevent recovery by a guest of damages
resulting from the negligence of a driver and allows recovery
only in case the driver's acts were intentional or in heedless
disregard of the rights of others.
The facts in the instant case at most would support a finding only of simple negligence as to the elements of speed and
lookout, and consequently the plaintiff has failed to meet the
burden imposed upon him by statute. The evidence does not
show a reckless disregard for the lives of others. The defendant's conduct was such that he did all he could to avoid the
tractor that was obstructing the highway and certainly this does
not warrant a finding of reckless disregard for others. A careful
distinction should be drawn between neg1igence of a driver
and heedless and reckless disregard on the part of a driver
for the rights and safety of others.
The difference between reckless misconduct and negligence is well stated in Wilson v. Bacon, supra, p. 909, as follows:
"Reckless misconduct differs from negligence in
several important particulars. It differs from that form
of negligence which consists in mere inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness or a failure to take precautions to enable the actor adequately to cope with a
14
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possible or probable future emergency in that reckless
misconduct requires a conscious choice of a course
of action either with knowledge of the serious danger
to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts
which would disclose this danger to any reasonable
man. It differs not only from the above-mentioned
form of negligence, but also from that negligence which
consists in intentionally doing an act with knowledge
that it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the
actor to be reckless must recognize that his conduct
involves a risk substantially greater in amount than
that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
The difference between reckless misconduct and conduct involving only such a quantum of risk as is necessary to make it negligent is a difference in the degree
of the risk, but this difference of degree is so marked
as to amount substantially to a difference in kind." 2
Restatement of the Law, Torts, § 500g." (Emphasis
supplied.)
The Turner v. Purdum case is directly in point and should
be followed in this case. The evidence does not show a consciousness of danger and a willingness to assume the risk, or
an indifference to consequences. Clearly this must be found
before the defendant can be guilty of reckless disregard.
Momentary inattention will not support a recovery 111 a
guest case. The state of Connecticut has the same guest statute
as does New Mexico, and it has been consistently held that
conduct arising from momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence,
or from error of judgment does not indicate a reckless disregard
of the rights of others.
See:
Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 376, 143 A. 240, 65 A.L.R.
943;
15
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Coner v. Chittenden, 116 Conn. 78, 82, 163 A. 472;
Bashor v. Bashor, 103 Colo. 232, 85 P. 732, 120 A.L.R.
1507.
In the case of Winn v. Ferguson, ____ Calif. ____ , 282 P.
2d 515, at page 516, the court states:

" . . . A .finding of wilful misconduct cannot be
predicated upon mere inadvertence or even gross negligence."
Our own Supreme Court in the case of Hudson v. Decker,
supra, p. 596, in holding the evidence insufficient to support
a contention of "reckless disregard" in construing the Idaho
guest statute stated:
"To permit a jury to infer from the mere fact that
defendant's car left the road under the circumstances
disclosed, (car left the road on a curve) that the
defendant was driving with knowledge of danger and
with conscious indifference to consequences, would be
to invite them to infer, not merely negligence, but
'reckless disregard of the rights of others,' from the
mere fact that an accident happened and someone was
thereby injured. To so hold would, in effect, cast the
burden of showing freedom from 'reckless disregard'
upon the defendant."
In summary as to this point the defendant's speed will
not sustain a finding of "heedless and reckless disregard of
the rights of others" nor will the mere monetary inattention
or improper lookout of the defendant justify such a finding
based on the law cited herein.

16
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING A MISTRIAL BECAUSE OF PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS MADE
BY COUNSEL IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT.
A supplemental transcript of the arguments for a mistrial
on the basis of the statements made by counsel is submitted
to the court for its consideration.
Counsel for plaintiff said during his opening statement
that the plaintiff and defendant had stopped and purchased
a sixpack carton of beer. A proper objection was made and
argument was then heard ( S. R. 1) . Counsel for defendant
set forth the reasons for said motion and they are found on
page three of the supplemental record.
Defendant contends that it was clearly error and as such
the trial judge should have granted a mistrial. The jury had
heard the statement and the defendant's position was prejudiced
by such statement and said objection was raised at the time
of trial (S.R. 5). The admonition of the trial judge (S.R. 7)
does not and did not correct the prejudicial effect of said
statement.
In the case of McCarthy vs. Spring Valley Coal Company,
232 Ill. 473, 83 N.E. 957, (1908), where the attorney for the
plaintiff interjected the fact that the plaintiff had a wife and
five children the court said:
"The statement to the jury that the appellant had a
wife and five children was manifestly improper. Its
only object could have been to enhance the damages
by getting before the jury, in this improper and unprofessional manner, facts calculated to arouse the
17
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sympathy which counsel know could not in any legitimate way be brought to their attention. To admit
evidence of such fact is error ... The fact once lodged
in the minds of the jury could not be erased by an
instruction and appellee by this statement secured the
benefit of the fact to the same extent as if he had introduced evidence to prove it ... It is impossible to tell
the effect on the verdict of the impression wrongfully
conveyed to the jury's mind by the improper conduct
of counsel."
A good statement of the general law is found in American
Jurisprudence, Vol. 53, page 358, Section 456, reference to
inadmissible evidence. It is generally held that statements by
counsel that certain evidence will be introduced are not improper if made in good faith and with reasonable ground to
believe the evidence is admissible, even though the intended
proof referred to is afterwards excluded. However, in the
absence of good faith, or where prejudice is clearly produced,
whether as a result of accident, inadvertence, or misconception,
the rule is to the contrary.
In Vol. 39, American Jurisprudence, page 71, Section
53, New Trial, we find the following statement:
"Misconduct of counsel for one party, if of such a
nature as to influence a verdict in favor of that party, or
to prevent the adverse party from having a fair trial is,
if proper and timely objection thereto is made, grounds
for a new trial. Such objectionable conduct may consist in improper remarks, comments, or arguments,
willfully and intentionally offering inadmissable evidence or propounding improper questions to witnesses,
making uncalled for abuse of witnesses, and other such
acts of misconduct calculated to influence or prejudice
the jury. Where there is any misconduct on the part
18
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of counsel for the prevailing party which appears to
have been liable, even though not intended to have
a pernicious effect upon legal proceedings, or a prevailing influence on the jury, there is reason for treating
the trial as a mis-trial and directing that the judgment
be set aside."
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court should have
granted defendant's motion for a mis-trial as it is absolutely
impossible to determine whether or not the jury considered
such improper statement of counsel, and the statement was
of such a nature that reasonable minds could only conclude it
would have a prejudicial effect upon the jury.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT END OF PLAINTIFF'S
CASE, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, AND MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Counsel for defendant made a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's Complaint (R. 217) and the grounds are set forth
in the record. It was error for the court not to grant this motion
based on the evidence that had been adduced.
The law as to the points argued is set forth m other
sections of the brief.
Defendant's counsel renewed its motion again at the close
of all the evidence (R. 226-227) and said motion was denied
by the court. It was error for the court to let this matter go
to the jury and not direct a verdict for the defendant.
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A motion for a new trial was argued and the court denied
said motion. Based on the law as stated above with reference
to the remarks of counsel in his opening statement, the evidence, the admissibility of testimony in error, and other errors
treated in this brief, this motion should have been granted.

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT NAMING THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION A PARTY PLAINTIFF AS
THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION WAS A REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST.
Rule 17 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest."
Counsel for defendant argued this matter to the Court
(R. 122) and the Court stated that it would take the matter
under advisement. Counsel for defendant (R. 217) made a
motion that the Veterans' Administration be made a real party
in interest based on the testimony of Mr. Monson. The court
denied said motion.
Based on the cross examination of Mr. Monson it is perfectly obvious that the Veterans' Administration is a real
party in interest. They admit (R. 213) that a bill would not
be sent to the plaintiff except for this lawsuit and they would
not expect to be paid. They further state their only interest is
that they will participate in the judgment if the plaintiff recovers. The services were rendered gratituitiously to the
plaintiff and he had no obligation to pay.
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If the court is going to allow the Veterans' Ad~inistration
to participate in the proceeds from a judgment for plaintiff
then the Veterans' Administration must be named as a party
plaintiff as they are a real party in interest.

It is stated in 39 American Jurisprudence, page 872,
Section 17, at follows:
" ... The term 'real party in interest' as used in
such practice provisions, in terms which indicate that
he must be the person to be benefited by, or entitled to
receive the benefit of, the suit."
Certainly the Veterans' Administration was in a position
whereby it would benefit by the judgment if favorable to
plaintiff but would have no interest whatsoever if plaintiff
failed to receive a judgment. Hence they should have been
made a part plaintiff. The jury was entitled to have this submitted to them in a proper manner.

POINT V
ERROR IN LAW TO ALLOW IN EVIDENCE ASSIGNMENT OF A PERSONAL INJURY TO THE VETERANS'
ADMINISTRATION AND TO ALLOW EVIDENCE RELATING TO A HOSPITAL BILL AT THE VETERANS'
ADMINISTRATION HOSPITAL.
It is a well settled rule that in the absence of a statute
to the contrary a cause of action to recover for personal injuries
IS not assignable.
The court erred in allowing Exhibit "G" in evidence, which
i$ the bill in the amount of $3,300.75 for treatment of plaintiff
21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

at the Veterans' Administration Hospital in Salt Lake City,
Utah. The Court further erred in allowing testimony and
evidence relating to any charge for such treatment.
The evidence is clear (R. 215) that an assignment was
executed by the plaintiff on the fifth day of September, 1957
(Exhibit H) and that another assignment was made on the
tenth day of December, 1957 (Exhibit I). The testimony of
William S. Monson (R. 218 et seq.) related solely to the
treatment of plaintiff at the Veterans' Administration Hospital
in Salt Lake City, Utah and the charges therefor.
A recent annotation holding that a personal injury claim
is not assignable unless stautory authorization exists is found
in 40 A.L.R. 2d 501. Many cases are cited therein establishing
the rule as stated above. These cases are from jurisdictions
all over the United States. There is a Utah case directly on
this point in In re Behm's Estate, 213 P. 2d 657, which follows
the said rule. This case distinguishes between the assignment
of a cause of action for personal injury and the assignment
of the proceeds of a judgment rendered in such a case. At
pages 662-663 the cour states as follows:
"In the first cited case, the injured person assigned
to a hospital a share of any proceeds he should acquire
from any settlement or judgment to be paid by the
tort-feasor. The court recognized that under the law
of the state of New York the cause of action was
non-assignable, but held that the assignment of a
share of the proceeds was enforceable in equity."
"To rule that I cannot assign the cause of action,
but that I can transfer 100 per cent of its proceeds
sounds anomalous. It is tantamount to saying that I
can transfer the substance but retain the shell; that
22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I can give you the right to the recovery, but I must
hold the right to recover. However, repeated precedents of many years' standing tell us this is the law."
The evidence is clear that the plaintiff owed the Veterans'
Administration nothing until such time as he secured a judgment against defendant and that then by virtue of the assignment which he gratuitiously executed several months after
the conclusion of his treatment at the Veterans' Administration
Hospital (R. 143), he had an obligation to pay them from
the proceeds of the judgment. Thus the hospital bill and the
assignment were completely irrelevant and immaterial as to
this case and were not properly an item of damages to be
considered by the jury.
The court further erred in instruction number seven by
informing the jury that if the plaintiff should recover a judgment he would be obligated to pay to the Veterans' Administration the sum of $3,300.75 from the proceeds thereof.

POINT VI
THE DAMAGES ARE EXCESSIVE AND WERE INFLUENCED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS
TO THE JURY AND PREJUDICED BY THE ERRONEOUS
SUBMISSION OF THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION
HOSPITAL BILL.
The damages awarded the plaintiff are excessive and were
materially affected by the court's error in instructing the jury
with reference to the hospital bill of the Veterans' Administration.
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The defendant sets forth the following grounds as error
in admitting the testimony of Mr. Monson and the Veterans'
Administration records (R. 214-215):
1. The charge results only from illegal, improper and

invalid assignment of a personal injury action in tort;
2. It is not a proper item of damages, either special or
general;

3. It results from a voluntary assignment executed in
September of 19 57, after the services of the Veterans Administration Hospital to plaintiff had been completed;
4. The services were rendered gratuitously, and the Vet·
erans Administration has no right to recover except on the
basis of the previously-mentioned assignment, which, if valid,
is an assignment only of any recovery which plaintiff might
secure tn this action. Otherwise, plaintiff has no obligation

to pay;
5. The bill has not been paid, nor is it payable except
from proceeds from any judgment which plaintiff might secure
in this action.
6. There was no evidence that the charges were reasonable.
In further support of the defendant's position, cites 40
A.L.R. 2nd, 500, and particularly the portions in Section 2
on page 501. and Section 3 on page 502; and In Re Behm's
Estate, 21 _) Pacific 2nd 65 7.)
It is perfectly obvious that the verdict was inHuenced by
the admission of this evidence and the jury should not have
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been instructed as to the claim of the Veterans Administration
Hospital. The damages were not properly submitted to the
jury and as such the verdict is excessive. The defendant's
position was prejudiced thereby.
Although the case should not have been submitted to the
jury, when it was submitted the Veterans Administration
Hospital bill had no place in the considerations of the jury.
It is only reasonable to conclude that the amount awarded
to plaintiff was materailly affected by this evidence and the
instructions thereon, and very likely to an extent greater than
the amount of the bill itself.

POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
TESTIMONY OF ALVIN W. FOLGER AND DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE THIS TESTIMONY.
The plaintiff called as a witness one Alvin W. Folger to
testify as an expert witness as to stopping distances, reaction
time, etc. The record fails to disclose any brake marks whatsoever and further there is no testimony as to the surface of
the highway except that it was blacktop.
Officer Folger testified (R. 165) as to the necessary elements of determining the stopping distance of an automobile.
The hypothetical question put to the officer (R. 169) does
not state the facts in the case as there was no testimony that
the driver observed the danger, there were no brake or skid
marks present before the impact, it does not appear at what
25
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distance from the tractor and hay wagon the defendant was
when he observed them, and the other necessary elements
for the conclusions of the witness were not established by
the evidence in the case.
Counsel objected all the way through the officer's testi.
mony and made a motion to strike (R. 171) said testimony
as it did not relate to the facts in their entirety, contained
improper conclusions, was a mere guess by the witness and
was confusing to the jury. A further objection was made on
the basis that the officer was not a qualified expert. The court
should not have allowed the testimony and after it was ad·
mitted it should have been stricken.

POINT VIII
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS AND IN IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTING THE JURY.
The court erred in not granting defendant's requested
instruction number one. This instruction was to the effect that
the evidence does not support a finding that defendant operated
his vehicle in a manner to constitute reckless disregard of the
rights of others.
Defendant's instruction number two was to the effect
that the plaintiff assumed the risk as to the manner in which
defendant was operating the car. The facts clearly disclose
that this should have been given as the plaintiff at no time
protested to the defendant about his driving (R. 161).
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Instruction number s1x as requested should have been
given as it explains the difference between reckless misconduct
and negligence.
2 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 500 g.

Defendant's requested instruction number 10 should have
been given as it stated that more than one act of simple negligence on the part of a driver will not be combined to render
the driver guilty of reckless disregard of the rights of others.
Turner v. Purdum, supra.
Counsel for defendant took exceptions to the instructions
as given by the Court on page 245 and subsequent pages and by
reference thereto these exceptions are incorporated in this
brief. The defendant feels that said exceptions are with merit
and respectfully asks the court to review said exceptions and
their contents.

CONCLUSION
We believe that the court erred in submitting this case
to the jury, that plaintiff failed as a matter of law to meet
the burden of proving reckless disregard on the part of defendant and that there was thus no legitimate question of fact
to be decided by the jury.
Further, that the court should have granted to defendant
a dismissal with prejudice at the close of plaintiffs case and
should have directed a verdict in favor of defendant at the
conclusion of all of the evidence.
27
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

We further believe, without prejudice to the foregoing,
that defendant is entitled to a new trial if this court should
concur with the trial court with respect to the foregoing contentions. We base this contention upon the other errors assigned
in defendant and appellant's brief which were prejudicial to
defendant and which made it impossible for defendant to
have a fair trial by the jury or to have a verdict rendered
based on proper evidence, argument and instructions as to
the law.
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the judgment of
the lower court should be reversed and judgment awarded to
defendant dismissing planitiff' s complaint with prejudice and
granting judgment for no cause of action.
Respectfully submitted,

KIPP AND CHARLIER
Carman E. Kipp
SIMMONS, BEASLIN & NYGAARD
John Beaslin

Attorneys for Defendant.
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